Item No.   20

Meeting Date   **Wednesday 4ᵗʰ September 2019**

Glasgow City
Integration Joint Board
Finance, Audit and Scrutiny Committee

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BUSINESS CONTINUITY ANNUAL ASSURANCE STATEMENT

Purpose of Report:	The purpose of this report is to provide a position statement to the Glasgow City IJB Finance, Audit and Scrutiny Committee on the Disaster Recovery arrangements for the HSCP.

Background/Engagement:	An internal audit was carried out by Glasgow City Council in early 2019 to "ensure that the IJB has effective arrangements in place to gain assurance that the Business Continuity Planning and Disaster Recovery (DR) arrangements in place within the partner organisations are adequate". The audit acknowledged that the IJB has no formal responsibilities in terms of the business continuity arrangements of the Partnership, however it was recommended that an annual assurance statement to the IJB should be considered. The Business Continuity Annual Assurance Statement was considered by this Committee at its meeting on 12 June 2019 when additional detail and clarification on the position of DR arrangements for the Partnership was requested, including the current DR arrangements for telephony.

Recommendations:	The IJB Finance, Audit and Scrutiny Committee is asked to: a) note the content of this report.

Relevance to Integration Joint Board Strategic Plan:

Although the IJB has no formal responsibilities in terms of the business continuity arrangements of the Partnership, failure by the Partnership to respond to or recover from significant disruption could impact on the IJB's ability to deliver its Strategic Priorities

Implications for Health and Social Care Partnership:

Reference to National Health & Wellbeing Outcome:	Having robust business continuity plans in place for services aligns with Outcome 9 (Resources are used effectively and efficiently in the provision of health and care services)

Personnel:	Not applicable

Carers:	Not applicable

Provider Organisations:	Not applicable

Equalities:	Not applicable

Fairer Scotland Compliance:	Not applicable

Financial:	Not applicable

Legal:	Category 1 responders are required by the Civil Contingencies (Scotland) Act 2004 to have business continuity plans in place for critical functions.

Economic Impact:	Not applicable

Sustainability:	Not applicable

Sustainable Procurement and Article 19:	Not applicable

Risk Implications:	The risk of disruption to services is already noted in the service level and IJB risk registers.

Implications for Glasgow City Council:	Glasgow City Council is a Category 1 responder

Implications for NHS Greater Glasgow & Clyde:	NHS Greater Glasgow & Clyde is a Category 1 responder

1.   Purpose

1.1.   The purpose of this report is to provide a position statement to the Glasgow City IJB Finance, Audit and Scrutiny Committee on the Disaster Recovery arrangements for the HSCP.

2.   Background

2.1.   An internal audit was carried out by Glasgow City Council in early 2019 to "ensure that the IJB has effective arrangements in place to gain assurance that the Business Continuity Planning and Disaster Recovery (DR) arrangements in place within the partner organisations are adequate". The audit acknowledged that the IJB has no formal responsibilities in terms of the business continuity arrangements of the Partnership, however it was recommended that an annual assurance statement to the IJB should be considered.

2.2.   The Business Continuity Annual Assurance Statement was considered by this Committee at its meeting on 12 June 2019 when additional detail and clarification on the position of DR arrangements for the Partnership was requested, including the current DR arrangements for telephony.

3.   Disaster Recovery Arrangements

3.1.   DR is closed linked to Business Continuity Management. BCM focuses on maintaining business processes and ensuring plans are in place for manual workarounds and other back-up plans in the event of incident. DR focuses on planning for the repair, replacement or restoration of services, typically IT related services.

3.2.   IT DR for Glasgow City Council is provided by the Council's IT provider CGI, and DR for NHS GGC by its IT provider arrangements.

3.3.   The Council's Strategic Innovation Team (SIT) is currently undertaking an exercise with CGI to confirm its DR requirements for its systems, which CGI is contracted to provide. The Partnership has provided its requirements in terms of system recovery to the SIT for each of its Council hosted systems that support delivery of our most critical functions.

3.4.   The system recovery information provided by the Partnership to SIT is based on the requirements of our critical functions as detailed in their Business Impact Assessments (refer to the report to this Committee on 12 June 2019)

3.5.   The current position of the DR arrangements for key systems of both partners that support critical Partnership functions is detailed in sections 4 and 5 of this report. The current position of DR for telephony is included in paragraph 4.9.

4. Current Position (GCC systems)

4.1. CGI are contracted to run all ICT services from a data centre in Glasgow and an additional Disaster Recovery site in Wales.

4.2. Both these sites have a number of features to reduce the likelihood of a disruptive incident causing extended downtime of critical systems, including alternative power supplies and spare capacity.

4.3. The Social Care case management system Carefirst is currently resident in the Glasgow data centre and sits on a fully resilient platform alongside the Homelessness case management system I-World.

4.4. This arrangement for Carefirst and I-World means that if one component of these systems fail, another is available and will automatically take over. In addition all systems managed by CGI have a backup strategy in place where tapes are stored off site to allow restoration of the system in the event of total failure.

4.5. An interim solution has been put in place to provide a DR service for Carefirst in Wales, while designs are completed for a new DR platform which exceeds the current business continuity requirements of the Partnership.

4.6. Currently I-World and EDRMS have live servers in Glasgow along with test and development servers in Wales, which could be repurposed to function as a live system if required. Although this is not a proper DR solution, it does allow an option for keeping these systems active in the event of a disaster at the Glasgow site.

4.7. All Partnership key ICT services are currently resident in the Glasgow site except for Caresafe which supports Homecare services, and Community Alarms. These systems are currently undergoing a review prior to being moved to the Glasgow and Wales data centres (estimated January 2020).

4.8. Currently these systems are based in Borron Street in Glasgow with the DR site in Tradeston. The systems can be easily switched to either site in the event of a disruption, however the close proximity of the sites to each other is not ideal (for example, a single incident could affect both sites)

4.9. Telephony Services are being upgraded with the primary service installed in the Glasgow data Centre. A DR service has been installed at a data centre near Edinburgh which would activate in the unlikely event of a catastrophic failure at the Glasgow site.

4.10. Network and hardware upgrades are currently underway which will both improve the resilience of critical systems and also make accessing these faster.

5. Current Position (NHS systems)

5.1. The virtual desktop service, which enables staff in the Partnership to access systems across GCC and NHSGGC, is hosted in the Queen Elizabeth Hospital in Glasgow and Westward House in Paisley. The service can be delivered from either location in the event of a failure, and there are additional measures in place to reduce downtime in the event of a disruption (for example, alternative power supplies and spare capacity)

5.2. The EMIS Web application databases (which provide access to patient information) are hosted in Leeds where there are back up measures in place to reduce downtime, however EMIS relies on a Scotland wide network connection, which is a single point of failure (i.e. there is no back-up to this network).

5.3. The physical hardware that connects GCC staff to NHS systems (and vice versa) is also a single point of failure. A failure of this could cause systems to be unusable by either partner, with no back-up available.

6. Recommendations

6.1. The IJB Finance, Audit and Scrutiny Committee is asked to:

a) note the content of the report.